Changes in the population age structure can have a significant effect on fiscal sustainability since they can affect both government revenues and expenditures. For example, population aging will increase expenditures on the elderly while reducing potential growth and hence revenues. In this paper, we project government revenue, expenditure, and fiscal balance in developing Asia up to 2050. Using a simple stylized model and the National Transfer Accounts (NTA) data set, we simulate the effect of both demographic changes and economic growth. Rapidly aging countries like Korea, Japan, and Taipei, China, are likely to suffer a tangible deterioration of fiscal sustainability under their current tax and expenditure system. On the other hand, rapid economic growth can improve fiscal health in poorer countries with relatively young populations and still-growing working-age populations. Overall, our simulation results indicate that Asia's population aging will adversely affect its fiscal sustainability, pointing to a need for Asian countries to further examine the impact of demographic shifts on their fiscal health.
Introduction
In this paper, we project government revenue, spending, and fiscal balance in developing Asia up to 2050. By using the National Transfer Accounts (NTA) data set, UN population projections, and other data sources for long-range projections for real GDP, we estimate the fiscal burdens that countries are likely to face as a result of both economic growth and demographic changes. Changes in population age structure matter for public finances simply because the beneficiaries of public programs are primarily children and the elderly, while the working age population typically bears most of the tax burden. The fiscal balance can be worsen rapidly if age-related expenditures such health care for the elderly increase while the tax base shrinks due to the decline in the share of working age population.
Asia has experienced very dramatic changes in its age structure over the last few decades and these changes are certain to continue in the future. During the 1950s and 1960s, most Asian countries except Japan, where young countries, but since 1970, the share of young people declined rapidly while the share of prime working ages increased. The share of 60 and older also increased in many countries, most notably in Japan. Asia is now entering the third phase of the transition, where the old age population increases dramatically. By 2030, 20 of 42 Asian countries will have reached this final phase of the demographic transition.
Changes in age structure have a strong effect on financing public transfers. The beneficiaries of public programs are primarily children and the elderly while the most of the fiscal burden is borne by working age population. Figure 1 shows Japan's per capita public transfer flows by age. These numbers are normalized by dividing the annual flows by the annual per capita labor income of persons aged 30 to 49, the prime working ages in most countries. The benefit profiles for Japan shows two peaks. The first is for children, driven primarily by public spending on education, and the second peak is for the elderly, driven primarily by public pensions and publicly funded health care spending. The tax burden profiles peak around ages 45-55 when labor income peaks.
The aggregate flows by age are the product of the per capital flows shown in Figure 1 and population by age. These values are shown in Figure 2 . The influence of Japan's old population age structure is clearly evident. Most public transfers go to the elderly. In contrast, many developing Asian countries will see a decrease in budget deficit or increase in surplus because their working age populations will continue to expand. Rapid growth will also relax public sector budget constraints. The danger is that countries with favorable demographics and fast growth will implement generous transfer systems that ultimately prove to be unsustainable. In fact, lower income countries in Asia spend relatively little on public programs for reasons that are largely unrelated to demographic conditions. As lower income countries develop, however, the key issue for them is whether the public sector can expand at the same time that their populations are aging.
Methodology
The methodology is similar to Lee and Mason (2015) , which was used to project public spending for education, health, and social protection spending. Following Lee and Mason (2015) , we consider two main factors for our projections -changes in population age structure and changes in age-specific transfers due to projected changes in per capita income.
Projection Method
Let per capita transfers to persons age x in year t in country z be designated by ( ) ( , ) b z x t τ .
For purposes of projection we will use a normalized support ratio equal to public transfers per person relative to per capita income, y(t), so that public transfers per person age x in year t in country z is equal to ( ) ( , ) ( ) b z x t y t τ where ( , ) ( , ) ( ).
x t x t y t τ τ =  Thus, given the normalized transfer profile per capita, transfers are assumed to increase at the same rate as per capita income.
The normalized profile shifts upward in stepwise fashion as per capita income increases. In general, the normalized profile in year t is given by: 
The model is applied separately to revenue and spending using separate age profiles.
We calculate the changes in tax burden and spending given the base year age profile of tax and benefits and the projected population age structure:
Equation (3) is the ratio of per capita tax (spending) in year t relative to per capita tax (spending) on the program in the base year necessary to maintain the level of tax and benefits per person at each age.
Several features of this specification should be noted. First, it is important to understand that population size itself has no effect on tax revenue or public spending as a percentage of GDP although it affects the aggregate amount of revenue or spending. Since public expenditures which benefit everyone is assumed to increase at the same rate as per capita GDP, they do not affect our results. Non-tax revenues are assumed to increase at the same rate as per capita GDP, so they do not affect our results either. It is instead the population age structure which has a direct effect on revenue or spending as a share of GDP. The underlying intuition is that tax burdens and benefits are concentrated at particular age groups, as discussed earlier. Second, growth in per capita income within income groups does not affect transfers as a percentage of GDP, all other things equal. We assume that countries increase tax and spending as per capita income rises. The larger relative size of the government in richer countries supports this assumption. Third, public transfers are scaled to match the initial level (year 2010 in this paper) of tax revenue, spending, and fiscal balance in each country. Countries with large public sectors are projected to have large public sectors in the future.
Issues
The rationales for using the two factors -(1) changes in population age structure and (2) changes in age-specific transfers due to projected changes in per capita income -are somewhat obvious. Countries are quite different in terms of their taxation and spending component. First, the age profiles of taxation depends a lot on the tax base (i.e., the source of tax is labor, asset income, corporate, or consumption) but the base differs a lot across countries. For example, while Japan and Korea depend on income, corporate, and valued added taxes account for about 80 percent of their tax revenues, Korea relies less on income taxes. The financing of social welfare expenditures is also different in the two countries.
Broadly speaking, the tax base consists of direct and indirect taxes. The choice between direct and indirect taxes has long been debated in both academic and political circles. Income taxes can be classified as direct taxes and the same is true for most taxes on assets and wealth.
Indirect taxes such as value added tax fall on transactions such as consumption. MartinezVazquez, Vulovic, and Liu (2009) show that in the last three decades the average ratio of direct to indirect taxes has been rising, especially in developed countries. This is in large part due to the implementation of social security contributions. The importance of income taxes has declined in developing countries, while it has remained flat for developed countries. Within indirect taxes, there is an increase in consumption taxes, especially in developing countries.
There is a growing literature on the impact of the tax mix on economic growth, equity, and tax revenue. One part of this literature compares the effects of direct versus indirect tax choices in the context of the dynamic endogenous growth model. The evidence generally indicates that switching toward consumption taxation and away from income taxation has significant positive impact on growth and negative impact on income distribution (e.g. Li and Sarte 2004) . Different taxes might also lead to different evasion outcomes. Since income taxes are easier to evade than indirect taxes, tax authorities are more likely to rely on indirect taxes where tax evasion prevails. Having said that, developing countries may rely more on indirect taxes, while developed countries tend to rely more on direct taxes. A number of empirical studies show that reliance on direct taxes rises with per capita income (Hines and Summers 2009, Estrada, Lee, and Park 2015) . This has significant implications for tax burden by age, since the age profiles are quite different depending on the incidence of tax on income versus consumption.
Second, there is also a large variation across countries in terms of the expenditure mix.
For example, about 40 percent of central government expenditure is non-age related in the median OECD country, compared to the nearly 70 percent in a county such as Korea. This is because Korea still devotes a relatively large share of government spending to public investment and economic infrastructure rather than social welfare related spending. Hence Korea is less likely to be affected by population aging if we hold the profiles constant, compared with other OECD countries.
Third, there is an issue which is specifically related with Japan, which provides the target profiles of our model. Japan's tax revenues as a percent of GDP decreased from 14% in 1990 to less than 10% in 2012. As a result, Japan's tax burden decreased by 4.2 percentage points, while the average tax burden ratio in OECD changed little during the same period (around 25%). In fact, Japanese government cut their taxes in 1994, 1998, and 1999, while social welfare expenditure has been rising in large part due to population aging. Furthermore, the compensation of employees has grown little during the same period due to sluggish economy. Thus, the gap between the spending and the revenue has been expanding, resulting in accumulation of Japanese government debt. Simulation results in Kim (2015) show that Japan's fiscal position might have not deteriorated in the absence of tax cuts. The point here is that while Japan's welfare expenditure has increased, spending on economic infrastructure and others areas has gradually decreased. Japanese-style debt financing will not be possible for most Asian governments. In addition, the increase in tax revenue and expenditure will not be solely in the hands of central government because the increase will be shared with local governments.
Our projections do not explain why some governments are bigger than others. In fact,
there is no solid consensus on the determinants of government size, even though richer countries typically have larger governments. Public services require a certain critical minimum size, which implies that smaller economies tend to have bigger governments (Alesina and Wacziarg 1998) .
Openness may be linked to government size in a variety of ways because openness is a source of destabilizing external shocks (Rodrik 1996) . Certain modes of political representation, in particular, proportional and parliamentarian democratic systems -can also induce bigger government (Persson and Tabellini 2004 ).
We do not address differences across countries such as the tax base, composition of social expenditure, government size, or reliance on debt financing. In fact, there is little basis to make a long-term forecast of how tax revenue or public sector spending will change.
Consequently, our projections based on recent revenue and spending trends in higher income Asian countries as a guide to how revenue and spending are likely to change in lower income Asian countries. In spite of these limitations, it is nevertheless useful to understand the deteriorating fiscal trends in countries like Korea and Japan. For one, understanding Korean and Japanese trends can alert many Asian countries to the unsustainability of their current tax and expenditure systems.
Most of all, although the tax base and expenditure are key determinants of the age profile, it is clear that projections of government revenue, tax revenue, expenditure, and debt will also depend a lot on economic growth and population age structure. For example, Korea's tax base will shrink and expenditure will increase markedly due to population aging and decline in potential growth rate. So it is plausible to assume that the impact of population aging will be substantial even allowing for diverse patterns of tax bases and expenditures across Asian countries. Due to older population and slower growth, Korea's public debt to GDP ratio is projected to rise from 35% in 2015 to over 200% by 2060 (National Assembly Budget Office 2015).
Data
In this section, we describe the data used in our analysis. World Population Prospects, 2012 Revision (2013a , prepared by the UN Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs, is used for our analysis. All projections are based on the medium fertility scenario. This scenario assumes that fertility will continue to decline in high fertility countries and will recover towards replacement in low fertility countries. Details are available on the UN Population Division website (http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/).
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Long-term projections of real GDP are inherently difficult to construct. We rely on three sources of data, OECD projections for Japan, India, Indonesia, Korea, PRC, and Non-OECD 
Public Sector Finances
Data on public sector finances are based on National Transfer Accounts (NTA), a new set of economic accounts which document economic flows to and from ages in a manner consistent with the UN System of National Accounts. Research teams in about 50 countries on six continents are currently collaborating in the construction of NTA. Accounts have been constructed for eleven Asian economies -Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines, Korea, Taipei, China, Thailand, and Vietnam.
The theoretical foundations of the accounts build on Lee (1994; 1994) and some details and preliminary results are reported in Lee, Lee, and Mason (2008) and Mason, Lee, et al. (2009) . The most recent and comprehensive treatment is Lee and Mason (2011) . Methods are fully documented and explained in United Nation Population Division (2013b) and on the NTA website: www.ntaccounts.org.
In NTA, transfer inflows refer to flows received by the beneficiaries of all public programs, which are used for projections of public spending. Transfer outflows refer to the flows from taxpayers who are funding the program, which include taxes and other sources of revenue. For example, if the government runs a deficit, then transfer outflows are equal to taxes, plus other sources of revenue that make up the difference: grants, net public asset income, and dis-saving represented by the sale of public debt. In NTA, taxes provide the age pattern of all public transfer outflows, but not the macro controls. Instead, the macro controls are equal to public transfer inflows plus any net transfer of the program to Rest of World (ROW) entities.
Public transfer outflows are assigned to taxpayers based on rules that are similar to those followed in generational accounting. It is constructed in two steps. First, age profiles of taxes and social contributions are constructed. Second, these age profiles are combined with information about how each type of government program is funded (the "source") to construct age profiles of public transfer outflows by purpose (Table 2) . Public transfer inflows are public benefits, classified by purpose: education, health, pensions, and other public programs. This classification is consistent with the UN Classification of Functions of Government (COFOG), but simplified to emphasize large inter-age transfers. These public transfer inflows provide the age pattern of government spending.
Distinguishing the purpose of inflows is important for constructing age profiles. Transfer inflows for many public programs are assigned to the age group of the intended beneficiary of the public program in question using techniques described below. The inflows from public collective goods, e.g., national defense or diplomacy, public administration, and public safety programs are assigned equally among all members of the population, i.e., on a per capita basis.
Public spending on social welfare is much lower in low income Asian countries than in high income countries in per capita terms, but also relative to standards of living. As incomes grow in the region, taxes and public spending will become increasingly important. Exactly how countries adjust to higher income is a matter of policy and will be determined by political decisions within each country.
We use age profiles of tax and public spending by age for Asian countries for which NTA profiles are available, as follows. All profiles are per capita flows to persons at each age expressed relative to the average per capita labor income of those aged 30-49. Thus, given a particular profile, per capita flows rise at the same rate as projected per capita labor income for prime age adults. In addition, we assume that as countries become members of higher income groups that they will experience additional changes in their fiscal profiles. Four model profiles, constructed for the varying levels of income shown in Table 1 , are used to allow for the effects of income, as shown below in Table 1 a . In Figure 4 , the age patterns of government spending that are particularly visible for the older people due to the dramatic increase in their health expenditure. For low and middle income countries, the increase in spending on health care at older ages is less pronounced than for higher income countries, where health care spending rises very sharply with age. This guarantees that our projections depend on county specific growth rate, age structure change, levels of tax revenue versus non-tax revenue, the share of social welfare spending, and the level of debt financing.
2 Lee and Mason (2015) project government spending for education, health, and social protection respectively. Again, Figure 4 does not include the other public spending, which benefits everyone (i.e. allocated equally to the whole population) such as national defense. Nevertheless, other public spending is assumed to increase the same rate as per capita GDP and we calibrate the aggregate controls for whole countries at their 2010 values. Therefore, using the profiles, excluding the other public spending, which benefit everyone does not affect the results. Likewise, using the tax profile to estimate government revenue, including non-tax revenue will not change our results since we assume that non-tax revenue as a percent of GDP will not change over time.
Fiscal Projections
In this section, we present our projections for government expenditures, tax revenues, government revenues, and fiscal balance up to 2050.
Actual values (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) and projections of government expenditure to 2050 are provided in Table 3 . Populations are aging, which should push up the level of social welfare spending is increasing. In addition, higher levels of per capita income should push per capita spending on social welfare. For a few countries (see Table notes ), spending by all levels of government are included, but in most cases, the values refer to central government spending only.
Expenditure
On average, the increase amounts to a 3.3 percentage rise in the percentage of GDP spent on public expenditure. 
East Asia
South Asia
Southeast Asia
The Pacific
Developed Member Economy (a) projections may be quite conservative. We only emphasize the kind of benefits which are affected by the age structure. Other public spending may also increase rapidly, but they are not considered here. Other public expenditure can only be assessed with more extensive data with detailed information on the different components of public spending.
Developing Member Economies (a) Central and West Asia
Revenues and Fiscal Balance
Estimates of tax revenue and government revenue as a percentage of GDP for selected economies up to 2050 are presented in Tables 4 and 5 . Again, for a few countries (see Table   notes ) revenue at all levels of government are included, but in most countries, the values refer to central government revenue only. Tax revenues average 15.2% of GDP (simple average of country values) in Asia. The average figure is projected to increase to 20.2% of GDP by 2050, ranging between 1.5 and 39.5% of GDP.
The projected increase in revenue is driven by an increase in income level, and in some developing economies by increase in working age population as well. Since we assumed that the share of non-tax revenue as a percent of GDP will not change over time, the percentage change of tax revenue over time is same as the percentage change of government revenue. However, our projections for revenues as well as fiscal balance should be interpreted with extreme caution. In contrast to our spending projections, our revenue projections are not conservative. In the real world, raising taxes would be more difficult than raising government expenditure. This is especially true for rapidly growing countries, i.e., country group A in our model (Mongolia, PRC, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos, India, and Vietnam). As expected, our results predict fiscal improvement for these countries. For example, PRC recorded a fiscal deficit of 1.7% in 2010, but our projection shows a fiscal surplus of 6% in 2050. The same is true for Bhutan, which recorded the fiscal surplus of 1% in 2010. The surplus is projected to increase further to 10% in 2050, the highest level among Asian countries.
Figures 6 and 7 present the average of the actual and projected government expenditure, government revenue, tax revenue, and fiscal balance as percent of GDP. These are unweighted simple average of developing Asian countries, which is limited to all countries for which we have estimates and projections for 1995-2050. The simple average shows that on average revenues tend to rise faster than expenditures in our model. As a result, the fiscal deficit declines over time. balance is held constant. For Taipei, China, tax revenues rise to 22.3%, instead of 9.9%.
Decomposition Results
The projections of tax revenue, public sector spending, and fiscal balance are driven by changes in the level of taxation and spending and changes in age structure. Although the level of taxation and spending have been indexed to per capita income, it would be a mistake to interpret this as a causal relation between income and the level of spending. Instead correlates of income may account for some or all of the changes in the level of spending.
The analysis, presented in Tables 7-9 , is based on a simple decomposition procedure.
The value in first column of numbers, the 2010 value, is the actual share of GDP in 2010. The second column is the projected change in the percent of GDP between 2010 and 2050. The third column reports the effect of changing age structure calculated by holding the level of tax, spending, and fiscal balance at their 2010 levels, using population age structures for 2010 and 2050. The next column reports the difference between the total change and the change due to age structure as the amount due to age specific changes in the level of tax and spending. The interaction between changes in the level of taxes, benefits, fiscal balance, and age structure are reported in the following column. The final three columns in the table report the change due to age structure, age-specific level of spending, and interaction between the two as a percentage of the 2010 value (Tables 7 and 8 ) or as a percentage of percentage change from 2010 value (Table 9) . These values control for the large effect of the initial level of spending and allow us to focus our attention on the importance of age structure and age-specific level of spending.
For government expenditures the effects of changing age structure and changing levels of age specific spending mutually reinforce each other in East Asia (Table 7) . The age structure effects are by far the largest in East Asia, and particularly in Korea, Hong Kong, and Taipei, China. In those economies, age structure changes will raise government expenditure by 2.5 to 4.9
percentage points as a share of GDP by 2050. The effects are large in other countries, but nowhere near this large. The interaction effects are by far the largest in East Asia.
Somewhat surprisingly, the increase is much smaller in other Asian countries which are also aging rapidly, for example Thailand. There are two underlying reasons for this. First, aging in poorer countries has a smaller impact because welfare expenditures often do not rise as rapidly with age as in richer countries. While their welfare spending is projected to reach higher levels between now and 2050, the increase in pensions, health care and other elderly-oriented expenditures will be more limited than in richer countries. The second factor is the shape of the age profile. An increase in the 70+ population has a much bigger impact on expenditure than an increase in the number of 60-year-olds. East Asian DMCs are further along in their aging process and hence relative to Thailand, the very elderly account for a larger share of the increase in the old-age population.
The decomposition analysis for government revenue is presented in Table 8 . We do not report the results for tax revenue and government revenue separately since the decomposition results are same. All changes in government revenue are driven by tax revenue, not by non-tax revenue. Non-tax revenues and grants are assumed to increase as a fixed share of GDP in our model.
The share of the working age population is declining in East Asian economies and, hence, the impact of changing population age structure is to reduce tax revenues in this region. The impact is not big enough to offset the increase in tax revenues though. On average, changing age structure could reduce tax revenues by between 6 and 8 percent in East-Asia. The same is true for Singapore and Thailand too. On the other hand, most countries in South Asia and Southeast
Asia experience increase in tax revenues between 2010 and 2050. The effects in others regions vary a lot, ranging from 1% to 21%. The interaction effect is quite small.
The effects of changes in the level of taxation are non-negative in every country since the per capita age-specific level of taxation is assumed to rise as countries grow richer. The rising level of age specific tax is large enough to offset the effects of changing age structure in all countries. The age specific tax revenue increase is largest in countries that are expected to grow rapidly, such as PRC and Thailand. This is due the assumptions underlying our projections, which are based on observed data. Table 9 shows the decomposition of the fiscal balance. The last columns are negative if fiscal balance worsens and positive if it improves. If the contribution due to age specific change in the level is nil for both revenue and expenditure, then all change is due to age structure. For example, most countries in Central and West Asia, and the Pacific will not experience any change due to change in growth. All changes in their fiscal balance will thus be due to change in their age structure. Only demographic effects matter in countries that are very poor, or grow very slowly, and hence do not reach the income threshold that leads to an upward shift in the health profile. At the same time, only demographics matter in very rich economies such as Hong Kong, Singapore, or Japan, for the same underlying reason.
Although some Asian countries are currently in good fiscal shape compared with other regions of the world, such as Europe or Latin America (Roy 2015) , there is no guarantee that their fiscal health will last. Korea is an example of a country which is expected to simultaneously face a substantial fiscal deficit, slower economic growth, and population aging. Population aging will significantly harm the fiscal health of all East Asian countries. However, healthy economic growth could offset some of the negative impact of population aging. The PRC, which is assumed to grow rapidly until 2050 in our model, is a case in point. But in Korea and Taipei, China, both the age effect and the age-specific level effects will adversely affect the fiscal balance. In contrast, both the age effect and the age-specific level effects are benign and mutually reinforcing in many South Asian countries. The size of working population is still growing in these countries, while social welfare spending remains limited. High growth rate is the key driver of the region's fiscal improvement. 
Concluding Observations
While data limitations impede our analysis of the relationship between demographic change and fiscal sustainability in Asia, our findings nevertheless point to some important issues and considerations. The worsening fiscal health of countries like Korea, Japan, and Taipei, China, suggests that current tax and expenditure systems cannot guarantee future fiscal sustainability in aging Asian countries. On a more optimistic note, low income countries, which are still enjoying an expansion of the working age population under the second phase of the demographic transition, can help their own fiscal position substantially by growing rapidly. At the same time, it should be noted that population aging is a universal feature of Asian countries.
Only the timing and speed of the demographic transition varies and sooner or later they will face a deterioration of their fiscal health in the future, following the footsteps of Korea, Japan, and Taipei, China.
Our results for individual countries is based less on what we know about individual countries and more on what we see as broad patterns across the region based on selective data available for countries at different levels of development. Data about the interaction between the population age structure and the economy are underdeveloped. The age profiles of tax burdens and benefits are available for only a few countries. Little is known about how slow growth and population aging will influence the fiscal in the coming decades. This points to an urgent need to improve the quality of data, particularly data on public transfers in Asian countries.
Public programs are providing important sources of support for the elderly, especially in richer Asian countries. The key question is how to sustain or reform current old-age support systems in the face of rapid population aging. Our results show that population aging leads to very substantial increases in public spending and decrease in revenue even with constant age profiles. A critical priority everywhere is to improve our understanding of the connection between age, tax burden, and needs for support. Unfortunately, current policies often depend on definitions of working age or old age that are arbitrary and perhaps increasingly out of touch. 
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